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Why Home Prices Don't Fall (Much)
Variations in gross state product per (non-Federal)
acre, for example, explain much of the regional
home price variation in the U.s. (Chart 1). 'Even
the seemingly astronomical Japanese home
The variation in sitevalues across the U.S.
has a simple, economic rationale. in economic
parlance, sites are production factors that are
in fixed supply. ,A,S a result, diffeiences in their
productivity are "capitalized" into differential
site values. Empirically, rough measures of com-
parative site productivity, such as gross economic
product per usable acre, easily explain the dif-
ferences in home prices across the United States
and other countries.
Housing values and economic activity
Home prices do indeed vary significantly
across the United States, and California home
prices are high relative to prices in other states.
On the basis of median sales price, California
homes are at least 95 percent more costly than
the U.S. average. Although there are regional
variations in construction costs, tax policies,
and operating costs, the main reason for the
difference is the comparative cost of residential
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Home Prices Linked to Economic Activity










The analysts making these judgements seem to
rely on several arguments. First, they claim that
housing prices in California are so much higher
than elsewhere that prices "will have to fall" to
get back in line with other regions. Second, they
assert that home prices in California have risen so
much in recent years that a decline is inevitable.
In the words of Salem and Wang, "(A) huge rise
equals a huge potential fall!' Third, as home
prices decline, they believe that household per-
ceptions of wealth also will decline, causing
even greater home price declines. We will
address these observations in turn.
Recent magazine articles and stock analyst
reports have offered dire forecasts of coming
declines in home prices, particularly in "over-
priced" markets such as California. Residential
real estate is an important component of house-
hold wealth portfolios and serves as collateral for
about 23 percent of commercial bank assets.
Hence, home price trends influence consumer
buying behavior, and the soundness of the
banking system.
Forecasters of gloom
Underlying the debate over housing values
are several highly publicized reports forecasting
significant weakness in real estate markets,
especially California. A report by two New York
stock analysts, Salem and Wang, for example,
predicts a decline of 25 percent or more in
California home prices by mid-1991. A recent
Forbes article argued further that high home
prices in California were propelling activity out
of the state. Some analysts believe that this will
hasten the decline in home prices.
This Letter takes issue with the picture of the
California housing market offered in the popular
press. Neither theory nor data support the notion
of an impending "bust" in housing prices. In
addition, the relatively high home prices in Cali-
fornia are easily explained by the comparative
productivity of sites in that state, and thus
do not portend special problems.FRBSF
prices have an explanation in the extraordinary
productivity of usable sites in that country.
Similarly, trends in the productivity of sites
explain much of the path of home prices over
time. In California, for example, trends in the
gross state product (GSP) explain the bulk ofthe
sixfold increase in home prices that has occurred
over the last 20 years. The association is not a
simple one-for-one relationship, of course,
because tax policy and changes in inflation
expectations have influenced the comparative
attractiveness of holding housing versus other
assets. But GSP and inflation factors together
explain essentially all ofthe observed variation
in California home prices in the available data
period from 1970 to 1987 (Chart 2).
attractiveness of lower-cost areas elsewhere has
increase-d. The coastal areas of California have
virtua!ly no land-intensive, heavy industria!
activity, for example, because cheaper sites
elsewhere in the nation are apparently close
substitutes.
Many activities, however, need proximity to the
special agglomerations of activity represented by
California, New York, and other high-productivity
regions. For them, the profitability of those loca-
tions outweighs the costliness of the sites. Thus,
while some selective diffusion of activity will
occur over time, there is no reason to expect a
securities-like arbitrage process to equalize site
values abruptly. Unlike securities, sites are not
homogeneous or easily moved into new users'
portfolios.
No housing bubbles
The second assertion, that home prices must
fall simply because they have risen so much, also
does not survive careful scrutinv. This is tanta-
mount to asserting that large "bubbles" in home
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, Aprediction of home prices using only
the previous year's GSP and inflation rates.
Neither is an abrupt diffusion of activity to
other areas likely to depress demand for Cali-
fornia sites, as some other analysts have asserted.
As home prices have risen in California and other
dynamic areas of the nation, there is no doubt
that, for certain types of activity, the comparative
This suggests that a significantdownturn in
California home prices would require a sig-
nificant downturn in the California economy,
or a period of deep deflation in general prices.
Empirical work conducted at the Federal Reserve
Bank of San Francisco suggests that Salem and
Wang's forecast of a 25 percent decline would
require an even larger absolute decline in Cali-
fornia's nominal gross state product. It is unlikely
that the analysts are embracing such a forecast. Falling prices
Finally, housing pessimists believe that the
recent softening of home prices will snowball as
households feel their wealth progressively com-
promised by failing home prices. A weakening
economy would, of course, cause the demand for
sites to weaken accordingly; serious recessions
can even cause nominal home prices to fall.
Since fundamental factors such as aggregate
regional economic activity can easily explain
housing prices, there is little reason to embrace
notions of price bubbles. In addition, the condi-
tions under which asset price bubbles conceiva-
bly may arise are very unlike the conditions in
the housing market. In particular, pure price
bubbles(that is, nonfundamental price move-
ments) are thought to involve only certain types
of assets. In particular, to hold an asset whose
price may "burst" at any time, rational market
participants must presumably believe that they
can sell the asset quickly and cheaply before its
price turns down. Most financial economists
question whether even this condition is sufficient
to generate noninstantaneous bubbles. In any
case, we can hardly consider housing to be a
highly liquid asset with low transactions costs.
2
3
oHowever, historically, home prices have been
surprisingly resilient to economic downturns.
Even during the Great Depression, home prices
declined at most in proportion to the declines in
the economy as a whole. One multi-city price
series, for example, showed a 28 percent decline
when nominal per capita incomes declined by
about 32 percent. A series based on prices from
Washington, D.C., that implicitly controlled for
housing quality, showed a decline of only 20
percent.
The experience of home prices in Texas after the
collapse of oil prices in the 1980s offers a more
modern example of price movements under ex-
treme economic conditions. Employment in Texas
declined by about 3 percent after the oil price
problems of 1982-83; real income likely fell by
more. Home prices fell roughly by an amount
(3 percent) that was, at most, proportional to
the total decline in economic activity. Even in
Houston, whose economy went from boom to
bust (with an absolute decline in real activity
that likely approached 20 percent), there was no
evidence that home prices spiralled downward
by more than the decline in local economic
activity..
Home price resilience
Important asymmetries in the transactions cost
of selling into a down, versus an up, market may
further strengthen the resilience of home prices,
compared to, say, stock prices. Tax considerations
may be partly responsible. For example, capital
gains in housing are free from tax for most house-
holds, whereas losses experienced in residential
housing sales are not tax-deductible. Capital
gains tax policy therefore treats housing favorably
relative to other assets when the sale generates a
gain, but relatively unfavorably when the sale
generates a loss.
Tax policy also tends to retard the dumping of
houses and mortgages on lenders. In addition to
the cost of an impaired credit record, a house-
hold that walks away from its mortgage must pay
income tax on the full amount of the debt for-
giveness implicit in the default.
Finally, the behavior ofthe rental market
may retard sales in down markets. Falling home
prices by themselves, of course, would tend to
lower rental prices. However, the slower ex-
pected rate of appreciation effectively raises the
landlord's cost of doing business, and causes at
least partly offsetting increases in rental prices.
As an empirical matter, rental prices actually
increased in the last three recessions'(1970,
1974, and 1982) even as home prices softened.
The effects on the economy
These market asymmetries maintain the demand
for housing in a downturn despite expectations
of severely compromised income, and thereby
preserve home prices. Certain local markets, of
course, may experience exaggerated weakness in
prices, particularly if cash-strapped new devel-
opments are prominent. A broad crash in real
estate prices, however, is very unlikely, even
if the economy has entered a recession.
The stability of home prices is not entirely good
news, of course. The very household behavior
that preserves housing values is likely to exag-
gerate the effects of an economic downturn on
other sectors. To continue shouldering its hous-
ing expenses, a household with compromised
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